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When Benedetto Croce died in 1952, within six months of John 
Dewey, the two thinkers had lived long and remarkable lives, earning 
reputations for civic achievement that few philosophers have ever matched. 
In two domains – progressive politics and public education – their success 
had similar motives and the same reach, if we allow for their different 
historical circumstances. Also, in the smaller world of philosophy, both 
were wayward children of Hegel. Of philosophers from Italy and the United 
States in modern times, if any two were fated for convergence, that pair 
would seem to be Dewey and Croce. Sadly, instead of convergence, their 
lot was conflict – trivial and unworthy of them both. 
The habitual deafness of Anglophone philosophers to their Italian 
colleagues was part of the problem. Another part was the divergence in 
philosophical trajectories between those two cultures. Idealism – especially 
Croce’s idealism – thrived in Italy after expiring in Anglophonia. This 
mismatch was global. Locally and individually, Dewey’s eccentric career 
created other difficulties. In his creative period, after renouncing idealism, 
he philosophized in a way that was anomalous in its native setting, less 
intelligible to Americans than Croce’s reformed idealism was to Italians. 
For Italians alert to Dewey as a voice of pragmatism – a movement admired 
in Italy for its energy even by critics – the confusion was fatal, while for 
Americans it was merely bewildering.
1
 
                                                 
1
 In Guyer (2014), 3.105, the third volume of an authoritative history of 
aesthetics, Croce enters as an expatriate: “in spite of Croce’s indubitable 
centrality in the history of Italian philosophy, he will be considered here 
because of his enormous influence in Anglophone, especially British, 
aesthetics.” To be sure, Guyer’s account of Croce is a vast 
improvement on the attitudes described by Simoni (1952) and Roberts 
(1995); the latter compiles a medley of caricatures of Croce as “a 
romantic, an expressionist, a primitivist, and a partisan of irresponsible 
 52 
Having started as a neo-Hegelian in the Anglophone style, Dewey 
abandoned idealism because he found it helpless against dualisms that he 
had once hoped to defeat with Hegel’s weapons. That was the pars 
destruens of his career. The pars construens grew from the allure of 
pragmatism, as first taught to him in the classroom by Charles Peirce and as 
he learned it later from William James’s books. But Dewey’s turn to 
pragmatism led him away from the usual epistemic puzzles, which he tried 
to preempt with a holist metaphysics and psychology, grounded in an 
original phenomenology of experience.
2
 
While Husserl was constructing a different phenomenology and 
giving it that name, Dewey had cognate but undeclared ambitions, lacking 
Husserl’s persistence and finesse. But what Dewey produced in metaphysics 
sometimes has the flavor and power of Husserl’s student, Heidegger, if only 
sometimes. For the home audience – English-speakers friendly to 
pragmatism as a reform of British empiricism (despised by Croce as 
‘sensism’) – this creativity made his work difficult. The post-idealist 
Dewey used a vocabulary familiar to Americans: ‘action,’ ‘experience,’ 
‘ideas,’ ‘perceptions,’ ‘qualities,’ ‘relations,’ ‘sensations,’ ‘truth’ and so 
on. But, to the native ear, he was speaking this language creatively, in 
utterly new and – culpa felix – baffling ways. When Croce heard him from 
abroad, the muddle could only get worse. 
To gauge the originality of Dewey’s thinking, ideas are a place to 
start. For him, ideas (meanings) are bio-social and behavioral. They are 
organic and interpersonal responses – physically grounded – to situations. 
Ideas operate to settle unsettled situations, guiding them from states of 
disequilibrium to equilibria that are dynamic rather than static. Humans and 
some other animals encounter situations directly in larger contexts of active 
experience – interactions with the environment that sustain all animals and 
shape all existence. Situations are spatio-temporal wholes integrated by 
relations among their parts, which are events or transactions. 
                                                                                                                            
private imagination.” For Dewey’s reception in Italy, see Federici 
Vescovini (1961). 
2
 Fesmire (2015) is a recent survey of Dewey’s thought; Hook (2008), 
originally published in 1939, is alivelier account by a student and 
advocate – known as ‘Dewey’s bulldog’; Jane Dewey (1951), by 
Dewey’s daughter, was approved by Dewey before publication. 
 53 
Drifting in and out of homeostasis, situations attain, lose and recover 
stability. In all its components, a reconstructed or restabilized situation has 
reappropriated an individuating quality (like the Scotist hecceity revived by 
Peirce), which is otherwise indeterminate yet experienced as meaning: this 
quality marks the situation as just the unified particular that it is and shapes 
its teleological development. Perception, which is non-cognitive but active 
– not passive like merely receptive sensation – works to stabilize this 
unitary meaning as it develops. Perception grasps the relations – even before 
they are known – that tie a situation’s elements together, making purpose 
and meaning out of psycho- physical materials presented in the situation. 
Meanings properly developed are ideas, and ideas are plans for action, the 
aim of the planned action being to stabilize a situation as it finds closure. 
Ideas and meanings are behavioral, social and objective: the observed 
sharing of them establishes their objectivity. But meanings are not static; 
they develop and have histories. Some meanings have been used in the past 
to reconstruct previous situations: those meanings have been habituated as 
tools for planning the actions that ideas aim at presently and in the future. 
Ideas – ideas in propositional form, strictly speaking – are true or false in 
virtue of such results, if they have been predicted and are publically 
observed. An idea is good or true or effective that underwrites a verified 
prediction, thus helping to resolve an unstable situation by settling an 
inquiry: again, Dewey follows Peirce, his teacher. 
In hypothetical form, predictions are inferential. Predicting might then 
need a logic or theory of inference. But Dewey’s logic – the core of his 
work after turning from idealism to pragmatism – is a method and theory of 
scientific inquiry, meant to explain why logic bears on action, as plainly it 
does. Inquiry proceeds by testing predictive hypotheses against public 
observations. Logical proofs are a type of test, and testing is sometimes 
physical, using material instruments. The standards for testing are 
conventional yet reliable, rules given priority as habits of reasoning 
observed to work better than other rules as guides for confirming or 
disconfirming predictions. 
Such rules and other logical forms are not a priori: they come from 
inquiry, which is the discourse, viewed operationally, that manipulates 
symbols as steps toward manipulating things. Logical forms (L) warranted 
by yesterday’s inquiries constrain inquiries today, using symbols 
instrumentally to resolve situations (unsolved problems) that need 
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resolution. Starting within a situation (SQ) individuated by an otherwise 
indeterminate quality (Q), inquiry reveals that SQ needs reconstruction by 
comparing it with past situations (SR) already reconstructed. To move SQ 
toward reconstruction, plans of action – ideas, in other words – are stated 
in symbols to form predictions (PX) or hypotheses about elements of SQ. 
The PX are to be checked by observations, as those observations (refined by 
physical experiment) are counter-checked against the evolving PX. In 
keeping with L, the PX are converted into PY, PZ and so on, which are then 
compared to discover which types of P work best to advance the 
reconstruction of SQ. The inquiry reaches closure when SQ has been 
reconstructed – and a problem has been solved. 
Dewey’s logic as scientific action, with its claims about behavioral, 
situational and instrumental ideas, is the basis of a philosophy of 
experience, the doctrine that frames his aesthetics. Inquiry reconstructs a 
situated experience to study its scientific meaning, for the scientist to 
describe and analyze. Art reconstructs a situated experience to show its 
aesthetic meaning, constituted by the work of art and exhibited by a physical 
product of that work: the work of art is an action, not an object, which can 
only be a product of art. Both types of meaning, aesthetic and scientific, 
flow from actions that are both mental and bodily – sensing, perceiving, 
thinking – and are also continuous with one another, leaving no epistemic 
breaches of subject from object and no ontological gaps between matter and 
mind, body and soul. 
Dewey’s organic philosophy of experience treats everything as 
made whole and made one by ceaseless transactions between the world and 
all its parts and among all the parts. Experience is the entire field of those 
events, encountered in situations that have their own unities and are both 
mediated and immediate – the latter in that one’s experience of a situation is 
full and direct, in no way vicarious or piecemeal, the former in that the 
situation has temporal parts (events, transactions) that affect each other 
and the whole, one part leading to another and each reflecting the whole. 
Most experience is nondescript most of the time, never achieving 
integration. Most situations dissolve in indeterminacy, their integrity 
disrupted by resistance to it. Some situations, however, provide not just 
experience but ‘an experience,’ which is intense and memorable because it 
is unitary, bounded in time and headed for a goal or consummation. 
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Experiencing such situations may be pleasant, like hearing a symphony, 
or unpleasant, like having the flu. To be situations at all, these cascades of 
events must be integral and particular, individuated and regulated by an 
otherwise indeterminate quality that makes the situation just what it is – 
that situation and an experience. 
Situations equipped with such a quality – individuating and regulative 
toward wholeness and purpose – are the remarkable experiences in which 
meanings propagate. Meanings may be scientific or may be moral but are 
always aesthetic in some measure. In most situations, however, the 
regulative quality that gives rise to meaning remains tacit: only an 
aesthetic experience makes its quality explicit as an exhibited ground of 
meaning. But that particular situation, in the web of all situations, also 
illuminates the role of some such quality in every situation, whether or not 
its meaning is explicitly aesthetic. 
Just because they are situational, the scientific experience of inquiry 
and the moral experience of choice also have aesthetic character, though it 
usually goes unremarked. Since an aesthetic experience always displays the 
quality of its situation, giving access to it as meaning, aesthetic meaning 
reveals more about the philosophy of experience than science, morality and 
other such efforts. “Esthetic experience is experience in its integrity,” says 
Dewey: “to esthetic experience, then, the philosopher must go to understand 
what experience is…. The theory of esthetics put forth by a philosopher … 
is a test of the … [philosopher’s] system.”3 
The primary aim of aesthetic theory is to clarify the experiential work 
of art, which is a situated process, not a thing – though things like poems on 
pages or paintings on walls or sonatas in music halls are products of such 
processes: both the product and the process are spatio-temporal. “The real 
work of art,” according to Dewey, “is the building up of an integral 
experience out of the interaction of organic and environmental conditions 
and energies.” Once integrated in this way, an experience stands out as 
aesthetic. But its aesthetic character does not detach it from ordinary 
experience. Each situation hovers between integration and disintegration in 
a matrix of other labile situations. All are possible contexts for meanings 
exhibited as aesthetic: eating a cookie (Proust); seeing a grid of streets 
                                                 
3
 Dewey (1934), p. 274: for recent accounts of Dewey’s aesthetics, see Alexander (1987); 
Shusterman (2000), pp. 3-33; Guyer (2014), 3.309-34; Fesmire (2015), pp. 189-217. 
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(Mondrian); strolling past pictures at an exhibition (Mussorgsky) – all 
within the continuum of the everyday experience where only some 
situations present their aesthetic character.
4
 
Just as Dewey finds no “chasm between ordinary and esthetic 
experience,” he sees “art itself as the best proof of a … union of material 
and ideal.” Ruling out any body/mind or matter/spirit or nature/freedom 
opposition, he puts material objects alongside embodied thoughts (the only 
thoughts) within aesthetic situations, which get started not from “mere flux” 
but from the dynamic equilibria that operate even in non-living matter. 
Rhythms of loss and recovery of integration with the environment are more 
apparent in living organisms, however: plants and animals thrive on 
harmony and unity with the world, growing when they overcome 
obstacles to that unity and, when they do not prevail, finally dying.
5
 
Nature throws up barriers to the unifying of situations and to 
embedding them in the matrix of other situations. These disruptions of 
harmonious experience are productive in many ways: they stimulate 
evolution in biology, learning in society and aesthetic activity in culture. 
Humans – in whom consciousness has evolved but who first encounter 
experience pre-cognitively – initially become conscious not of any 
integrated situation but of resistances to it, things and forces that fragment 
and destabilize what could otherwise be unified and stable. As moments of 
loss (death, in the end, so the stakes are high) and of recovery (health and 
growth, for a time) enter consciousness, psycho- physical materials that 
might be lost or recovered for a situation can be selected as of interest to it, 
and in their contingency these materials arouse emotion (still indistinct and 
unconscious) in the conscious agent. 
Once a situation has fully and finally recovered, leaving nothing 
precarious about it, its aesthetic career is over: no longer at risk, that 
situation no longer stands out as an experience from the slack, humdrum, 
anaesthetic background of most experience. Even when it lacks tension, 
however, experience stays active and interactive, right from the start. 
“Impulsions are the beginnings of complete experience,” says Dewey, 
“because they proceed from … a hunger … that belongs to the organism as 
a whole and that can be supplied only by … interactions with the 
                                                 
4
 Dewey (1934), pp. 3, 11, 37, 54-5, 64. 
5
 Dewey (1934), pp. 10, 13-15, 27. 
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environment.” Impulsions of the whole organism, like a vampire’s craving, 
are not mere ‘impulses’ or local reflexes, like a gland salivating at a feeding 
bell.
6
 
When resistances to impulsion provoke the impelled agent to solidify 
a dissolving situation by resisting those same resistances, the agent 
profits by awareness of what resists its impulsion: a fully evolved faculty 
of consciousness will work to the agent’s advantage, making it realize that 
material threats to situational integrity can be turned into means to that very 
end. Resistance guides impulsion, at first blind, to reinforce itself 
counteractively. “Such is the outline of every experience that is clothed with 
meaning,” Dewey explains, “a transformation of energy into thoughtful 
action, through assimilation of meanings from the background of past 
experiences.” Primitive, impulsive, ineffective actions within the repertory 
of all living things become effective as human and intelligent steps toward 
meaning.
7
 
Impulsions can be discharged directly or expressed indirectly. On a 
smaller scale, a discharged impulsion – a craving satisfied, for example – is 
like a situation closed by achieving the reconstruction of its integral 
character: it can no longer be an experience. To lead to that aesthetic 
situation, an impulsion must be expressed over time, not instantly 
discharged. 
An infant, just a few weeks old, screams and keeps screaming and 
then stops: an impulsion has been discharged, but nothing has been 
expressed. (A parent who finds the screaming expressive is mistaken, 
strictly speaking.) A few months later, the child repeats the performance. 
Once again, the screaming goes on and on, and then it stops. But by now 
the child has lived through many such situations, watching others react to 
them, also experiencing pains – bleary eyes, runny nose, raspy throat – as 
materials not only of the enraged situation but also of its meaning, of 
the expressed rage that may become entirely theatrical for an even older 
child: the rage will then be the childish work of art that never charms its 
audience.
8
 
For a child to turn rage into drama, for a hunger artist to make 
art out of a craving, healthy organs of sense, attached to motor apparatus 
                                                 
6
 Dewey (1934), p. 58. 
7
 Dewey (1934), p. 60. 
8
 Dewey (1934), pp. 61-3. 
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in good order, are needed but not enough: an artist of the situation must do 
more than sense the materials presented by it; she must perceive and 
transform them. Sensation and perception are both receivers of experience, 
but sensation is passive receptivity, where perception is active. Sensation is 
enough to recognize things and their relations. In nesting season, birds sense 
and identify the twigs and leaves that will go into nested relations: that itself 
is a situational achievement. But the recognizing falls short of perception, 
which grasps materials in their relations instrumentally, seeing them as 
means to ends – to rescuing a situation from its constant peril. 
What a bird does, with its sensory equipment and perhaps a wisp of 
purpose (some birds may be tool-users), is a model for the architect: even 
so, the bird’s project lacks the intentional and proleptic character of art. 
Does the bird ever think – thinking about a nest to be constructed in the 
future? It seems not. But the perceiving human who turns an enraged 
situation into tragedy will have made that drama a goal and will have 
thought about it artfully, taking meanings (ideas fit for a king named Lear) 
suited to it from matching situations now past (sad stories of the death of 
kings). 
Within experience there is doing and undergoing, agere and pati, 
action and passion, which must be unified and balanced to keep a situation 
stable – or, in case of instability, must be rebalanced. Conscious experience, 
enjoyed by the artist who perceives the equipoise of doing and undergoing, 
enables her – as the doer of the work of art – to detect the situation’s 
balance or imbalance. She then maintains or sets it right by selecting some 
materials, related within the situation, as of interest for the situation and also 
by adjusting them in various ways. 
Such doing always entails undergoing, which stimulates further doing 
and hence more undergoing and then more doing and so on until harmony 
prevails and closure – not cessation – arrives. All situations, playing out in 
time, come to an end. Only aesthetic situations reach the closure that Dewey 
calls consummatory, the finale of an experience. Cycles of doing and 
undergoing, patterns of action, give such an experience its aesthetic form 
and structure, the meaning grasped by perception, which is intelligent and a 
kind of thinking. Aesthetic thinking, grounded in unmediated perception of 
those rhythmic patterns, is directly about qualities – unlike science, which 
thinks about things indirectly, by way of signs. 
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Emotion pervades perception, which acts through the whole organism; 
agitated by an impulsion, a pervasive emotion can color a whole situation. 
Except for that excitement, however, impulsion produces nothing that can 
be expressed. And for the excited situation to become an experience, the 
excitement must be intentional – for or about something in the situation 
within which excitement stirs. Apart from its intentionality, this emotion is 
indistinct, not yet love as apart from fear or joy as apart from hate – 
distinctions beyond the reach of direct, pre-cognitive perception. Still, this 
global charge of emotion excludes what it opposes, building toward an 
experience by selecting from among the materials presented in the situation 
– choosing some as of interest for a work of art. Emotion is also the glue 
that holds the chosen materials together. 
In an otherwise anaesthetic situation, these natural materials that 
underlie emotion also supply its content. Emotion selects and organizes 
them as means and media of expression, which – unlike perception – is 
therefore mediated. To be expressive, the work of art needs emotion, 
which is not the work’s content nor what is expressed. What is expressed is 
the meaning or meanings of the situation, where generalized meanings 
(ideas) are assimilated from past experience to be joined undividedly with 
current experience – concrete, particular, unmediated and directly perceived. 
An expressive act works on material both inside and outside the instant 
situation, making inner, emotional material meaningful as aesthetic content, 
changing the outer material of past experience into means and media of 
expression. Expression clarifies the originally turbid emotions that respond 
to blind impulsions: expression (including representation) in art 
particularizes meaning, while statements in science use signs to generalize 
the meanings that they represent. 
“Consciousness is always in rapid change,” Dewey writes, “where the 
formed disposition and the immediate situation touch…. It is turbid when 
meanings are undergoing reconstruction … and becomes clear as a decisive 
meaning emerges. ‘Intuition’ is that meeting of old and new” – of past 
meanings with present materials made meaningful by them – “in which the 
readjustment … is like a flash of revelation, although … prepared for by 
long and slow incubation…. The background of organized meanings” – 
taken from past experience into present experience – “can alone convert the 
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new situation from the obscure into the … luminous. When old and new 
jump together, like sparks …, there is intuition.”9 
Unlike emotion, expression and perception, intuition gets no headlines 
in Dewey’s account of the aesthetic situation. But the few words he 
gives to it place intuition securely in his theory. Current situations draw 
on past meanings to mark some situated materials as meaningful and hence 
of aesthetic interest. When meaning seems to arrive suddenly, even though 
the preliminaries have been long, we call it intuition. At this point, Dewey 
has nothing more to say about intuition, except that it is “neither an act of 
pure intellect … nor a Crocean grasp by spirit of its own images.” Later, 
however, he singles out the word ‘intuition’ as especially ambiguous. 
Although Platonists have taken essence to be its proper object, Croce has 
merged intuition with expression and has identified both with art, giving 
“readers a good deal of trouble.”10 
Dewey traces the trouble to Croce’s “philosophic background,” which 
disposes him to impose theory on “an arrested esthetic experience.” 
Uninformed about Croce’s unarrested experience of so very many arts, 
Dewey reaches this snappish conclusion about an idealist who “believes 
that the only real existence is mind.” If the empiricist’s perception, as seen 
by the idealist, is of objects deemed to be extramental, what grasps the 
reality of art can be no such thing. It must instead be intuition, which 
“knows objects as, themselves, states of mind.” These mental states are 
what expression manifests, what intuition knows and what a work of art is 
constituted by – according to Croce. Like Schopenhauer, he gets credit for 
greater sensitivity to art than most philosophers. “But his version of 
aesthetic intuition is … [a] complete failure of philosophy.” Claiming no 
interest in refuting Croce, Dewey calls his view – as stated by Dewey – 
evidence of “the extreme to which philosophy may go in superimposing a 
preconceived theory upon esthetic experience, resulting in arbitrary 
distortion.”11 
To be of any use at all, of course, a theory (as distinct from an insight) 
must be preconceived – conceived in advance of what it explains. What 
really rankles Dewey, however, is not prejudice or preconceptions but the 
idealism that he attributes to Croce, viewing it with his own practiced eye 
                                                 
9
 Dewey (1934), p. 266. 
10
 Dewey (1934), pp. 266, 294. 
11
 Dewey (1934), pp. 294-5. 
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after repudiating that faith for a different one – pragmatism. Since 
pragmatism is usually identified with the theory of truth promoted by 
William James, Dewey’s conversion to it might be seen in epistemic terms 
as just another spasm of the post-Kantian Erkenntnisproblem. But it was 
the experimentalist James of the Principles of Psychology (1890), along 
with Peirce and his logic, who turned Dewey away from Hegel. 
Dewey’s own insights, crystallized in 1896 by “The Reflex Arc 
Concept in Psychology,” were more psychological and metaphysical than 
epistemic. His famous article revises the schema of stimulus and response, a 
dogma of the new (at the time) experimental psychology. Dewey charges 
that “the older dualism between sensation and idea … [and] of body and 
soul finds a distinct echo in the current dualism of stimulus and response.” 
His remedy is to show, empirically and conceptually, that “the so-called 
response is not merely to the stimulus; it is into it.” Stimulus and 
response, always seen “as distinct physical existences,” are really “always 
inside a coordination and have their significance purely from the part played 
in maintaining or reconstituting the coordination.”12 
After much reworking, the ‘coordination,’ ‘significance’ and 
‘reconstituting’ of Dewey’s 1896 article would become the ‘situation,’ 
‘meaning’ and ‘reconstruction’ of Art as Experience in 1934. By then, 
Dewey was the last surviving prophet of pragmatism, which he sometimes 
saw as ‘instrumentalism.’ Now a public figure of great stature, he stood 
behind a principle of continuity in a philosophy of experience that was his 
settled answer to the metaphysical (body/soul) and epistemic 
(sensation/idea) dualisms that he had called out in 1896. At that time, 
however, he had already been doing philosophy for fourteen years as a 
Hegelian, finding in that system “an absolute mind … manifested in social 
institutions” – his first defense, now deemed wanting, against dualism.131 
In 1940, when Croce first replied to Dewey’s harsh words in Art as 
Experience, it would have been hard for him to know much about his 
critic’s long march away from idealism. For Italians as for others, Dewey 
was a pragmatist, and pragmatism was the epistemic doctrine that makes 
“the practical success of a thesis the criterion of truth” – nothing like the 
rich phenomenology of situations recorded by Art as Experience. 
                                                 
12
 Dewey (1896). 
13
 Jane Dewey (1951), p. 17. 
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Commenting on the political excitement about Dewey in post-war Italy, 
even the acute Garin misjudged the American’s Hegelian past, finding it 
“interesting how much he could assent to some idealist claims, even if they 
were acquired unconsciously.” To Italy’s idealist faithful before the War – 
Guido De Ruggiero is Garin’s witness – Dewey’s flashes of orthodox 
insight had looked like bulletins “from the lands of the infidels.” But 
Dewey was no infidel. He was an apostate, not the least unconscious about 
idealism.
14
 
Had Croce seen his critic as a fellow expert on Hegel, had he 
known how carefully Dewey moved toward his breach with idealism, 
perhaps his reply to those few nasty lines in Art as Experience could have 
been more generous – less sordid than an insinuation of plagiarism. 
Likewise, a deeper, longer look at Croce’s aesthetics in its whole 
development might have kept Dewey from insulting that great thinker in the 
first place
15
 
Reading the “Reflex Arc” of 1896 as a prelude to other works – “The 
Postulate of Immediate Empiricism” (1905), How We Think (1910), 
Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), Experience and Nature (1925), The 
Quest for Certainty (1929) – reveals a system of great scope and ambition 
emerging over the four decades before Art as Experience. Equal (at least) 
in scope and ambition is Croce’s philosophy of the spirit, which also grew 
out of smaller but decisive works, some accessible to few Anglophone 
readers. Had the Dewey of 1893 known Croce’s breakthrough essay of that 
year, “History Brought Under the General Concept of Art,” or had he been 
a regular reader of La Critica, his own aesthetics might have gone 
differently.
16
 
By 1917 Croce’s whole project was on view in the English of Douglas 
Ainslie, who started with the Aesthetic in 1909. In 1915 Ainslie also 
translated What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel, 
                                                 
14
 Di Napoli (1961), p. 165; Garin (1997), pp. 567-77. 
15
 Croce was aware of Dewey’s early idealist phase: see Croce (1940), 
p. 353 and (1948), p. 207, on “the fanaticism and emptiness of … the 
Kantians and Hegelians who were his first masters.” 
16
 Croce (2006), pp. 7-145, translated with commentary in Copenhaver 
and Copenhaver (2012), pp. 92-98, 484-514; for bibliographical details 
on Dewey’s works, see “Writings of John Dewey,” which fills 75 pages 
of Schilpp (1951), pp. 611-86. 
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a crucial introduction to Croce’s mature thinking. That Dewey also read 
the friendly exposition of Croce’s aesthetics in Edgar Carritt’s works is 
clear: Art as Experience quotes Croce’s words in Carritt’s versions, with 
no mention of Carritt. Moreover, there is no trace in Dewey’s book of more 
than a glance at the first, pellucid chapters of the grandly titled Aesthetic as 
Science of Expression and General Linguistic. The spotlight on ‘expression’ 
in Croce’s title showed the Italian and American philosophers walking the 
same paths – already trod by many other students of aesthetics.17 
Closer reading would have shown Croce to be not at all shy about his 
idealism. Elements of experience that Dewey regarded as united and 
continuous – parts of situations indispensable to their wholeness – are “what 
still falls short of the spirit,” according to Croce, and are “actually non-
existent.” Since existence is a “fact of the spirit,” and since “impressions, 
sensations, feelings, impulses, emotions” are not of the spirit, they simply 
do not exist. Croce deposits the vital organs of Dewey’s aesthetics in the 
morgue of nothingness. Such items may be “postulated for the convenience 
of exposition,” but they are no part of reality: so much for a philosophy of 
embodied experience.
18
 
The aesthetics that makes this bold move has the courage of its 
ambition – to launch a system that “exhausts the entire field of philosophy.” 
The outlines of Croce’s philosophy of the spirit are familiar. The spirit’s 
theoretical activity is aesthetic and logical, its practical activity economic 
and moral; economy is “the aesthetic of practical life, morality its logic.” 
Will is the practical form of the spirit whose theoretical form is knowledge 
– of two kinds, intuitive and logical. Through intellect, logical knowledge of 
the universal and of relations produces concepts. Through imagination, 
intuitive knowledge of the individual and of things produces images. 
Intuition will be the gateway to aesthetics, then, and aesthetics is the portal 
to philosophy.
19
 
But philosophy has tended better to logic than to intuition, unaware 
that the mixture of concepts with intuitions in daily life is only apparent 
since concepts never survive the mixing, which eliminates their 
                                                 
17
 Croce (1915), (1953); Carritt (1914), p. 192; (1931), pp. 192, 241-2; Dewey (1934), 
p. 294; (2008), p. 364. 
18
 Croce (1953), p. 11, is Ainslie’s translation, cited here because of its relevance for 
Dewey; the Italian text of the edizione nazionale is Croce (2014), 1.44. 
19
 Croce (1953), pp. xxix, 55; (2014), 1.11, 91. 
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autonomy, while unmixed intuitions are everywhere in works of art. Even 
when these works contain concepts as well, their “total effect … is an 
intuition.” Although this intuition is perception, perception of this type is 
not confined to the actual – to what is grasped right now as real. The 
screen between real and unreal is transparent to intuitive perception. As to a 
child, nothing is real or unreal in this “undifferentiated unity of the 
perception of the real and the simple image of the possible.” In this state, 
we are not subjects perceiving objects already at hand. Instead, “we simply 
objectify our impressions, whatever they may be.”20 
Despite Croce’s formulation – le nostre impressioni – how 
impressions can ever be ours is unclear, since impressions belong to what 
“falls short of the spirit and is not assimilated by man.” Perhaps they are 
only “postulated for the convenience of exposition,” and in that case what it 
means to ‘objectify’ them might be moot. Yet this objectifying goes on “in 
our intuitions” – a key site for Croce. Although space and time are said by 
Kantians to be forms of intuition, “we have intuitions without space and 
without time” – instantaneously of a patch of color, for example. Not 
located in time or space, an intuition is still accessible to art because it has 
“character, individual physiognomy.” But Croce is no more informative 
about this character than about objectifying. We learn only that both are 
tasks of intuition and that the former is a mark “of things in their 
concreteness and individuality.” Concretezza – a refuge of the desperate in 
post-Hegelian Italy – was the language of the Aesthetic as of 1908, but 
Croce expunged it in revisions after 1922.
21
 
Intuition, with its concrete character, is barred from “sensation, 
formless matter, which the spirit can never apprehend in itself, … only … 
with form and in form,” though again sensible matter might be postulated 
“as a mere limit.” Across that boundary lies “matter clothed and conquered 
by form” – supplied with concreteness by form’s “constant … spiritual 
activity,” while formless matter stays passive and inconstant. To confuse 
simple material sensation with intuition defies common sense, according to 
Croce, though sensations may arise from memory or the unconscious in 
complex associations, as proposed by Hume and the ‘sensualists.’ But if 
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association gives rise to forms and distinctions, it will be productive and 
synthetic, an act of the spirit beyond the pale of sensing.
22
 
Like association, the “representation or image” has sometimes been 
treated as merely psychological rather than intellectual: this is Croce’s 
complaint. But just as association is synthesis only when enacted by the 
spirit, representation is intuition only when severed from psychology. This 
genuine representation or intuition is also expression. Since intuition is 
always of sensations and impressions, these are indeed what art expresses: 
“to intuit is to express,” and only that. In Ainslie’s translation, “intuitive or 
expressive knowledge (conoscenza)” is “the aesthetic or artistic fact (fatto).” 
This possible but flat-footed rendering misses conoscenza as 
‘consciousness’ and fatto as ‘action,’ ‘event’ or ‘deed’ – more like 
Dewey’s ‘doing’ than Ainslie lets on.23 
The aesthetic act is neither content alone (impressions) nor form 
applied to content (expression plus impressions). Art does not simply add a 
formative, expressive ingredient to impressions, leaving them enhanced but 
intact as what they were. Impressions go into expression “like water put 
into a filter,” Croce explains, “the same and yet different on the other side. 
The aesthetic fact … is form and nothing but form.” Impressions, where 
intuition gets content to express, are plainly necessary. And yet from 
content to form “there is no passage” unless and until impressions are 
changed by expression into form: before that transformation, impressions 
have no “determinable qualities.”24 
Expression’s relation to impressions is form’s relation to matter – a 
relation of absolute distinction. Only when formed will some impressions, 
though not all, play their part in the aesthetic act, which is synthetic as well 
as expressive, creating a purely formal “unity in variety” that excludes any 
non-formal, material principle of individuation. Nowhere in the aesthetic 
act’s content are there some impressions distinct from other impressions: 
since all the content is unformed, none of it can be distinct. Impressions, 
received by bodily organs, are starting points for expression, but the 
organs and their functions are merely physical and physiological, and 
“expression does not know physiological facts (fatti).” Even the 
“physiological path” to the mind goes one way for impressions, another way 
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for expression, whose activity is a “fusion of the impressions in an organic 
whole …, unity in variety…. Expression is a synthesis of the various in the 
one,” Croce concludes, also insisting that “every expression is a unique 
expression.”25 
Ainslie has ‘single’ rather than ‘unique’ for unica, used by Croce to 
claim a stronger singularity for expression than the mere individuation that 
matter might bestow on a particular. Nonetheless, the concreteness that 
Croce attributes to immaterial intuitions does some of the individuating 
work that aesthetic quality does for Dewey: Croce’s point is that intuitive 
knowledge – immaterial because matter has “no passage” to form – is of the 
individual and hence not abstract, just as Dewey’s perception grasps that 
situation directly, though pre-cognitively. Both Dewey and Croce locate the 
integrity of the resulting aesthetic act in an “organic whole.”26 
Both philosophers see aesthetics not as a division of philosophy – on a 
par with metaphysics or epistemology – but as a foundation, on the same 
level as logic. Philosophy itself for Dewey is a philosophy of experience, 
and it is aesthetics that studies experience. In the theoretical part of the 
Aesthetic, however, Croce shows no interest in experience – predictably, 
since both Kant and Hegel had left Erfahrung stranded by the spirit: as 
systematic empirical cognition for Kant, and for Hegel as sensory material 
ordered by concepts. Without commenting on experience, Croce precludes 
what Kant professes about it: that experience combines intuitions – 
represented passively to the faculty of sensibility – with concepts. In that 
impossible combination, concepts would lose the form that makes them 
conceptual. 
Since no traffic crosses a bridge from content to form, unformed 
impressions stay stuck on the side of nothingness. Only intuition and 
expressions exist, according to Croce – not impressions. Quite the contrary 
for Dewey, who slights the intuition that Croce exalts: the experience – 
ignored by Croce – within which situations emerge is impulsive and sensory 
before it is thoughtful. And undergoing is just as real as doing: both shape 
the aesthetic situation. Permitting no divide between action and passion, 
form and matter, Dewey has no worries about a gap between a situation’s 
materials (Croce’s impressions) and their meanings (Croce’s concepts). 
                                                 
25
 Croce (1953), pp. 19-20; (2014), 1.52-3. 
26
 Croce (1953), pp. 16, 20; (2014), 1.49, 53; Dewey (1934), pp. 54-5, 64. 
 67 
Doing and undergoing, patterns of embodied action, give the situated 
experience its aesthetic form and structure, as meanings grasped by 
perception. The quality of an experience – its inseparable individuator and 
regulator – does not need to be conferred on it by a transforming form. 
In Dewey’s judgment, Croce is still tangled in dualisms that Hegel 
had failed to untie. His besetting error is to think that whatever is material 
or bodily or sensory needs to be quarantined, waiting to be purged of its 
dross by the spirit’s immaterial form. Form dematerialized is a phantom, 
according to Dewey, nothing as mighty as the spirit ought to be. On the 
other hand, just as Dewey describes situations as integral, Croce says 
that expression is synthetic. The aesthetic act is organic for them both. 
Croce treats all impressions as candidates for expression, and Dewey 
believes that an experience can emerge from any experience. The whole 
world is the artist’s scene and stage. 
Still, in the end, Dewey’s philosophy of experience is aggressively 
naturalist – hence incompatible with Croce’s philosophy of the spirit, 
which is animated by a fierce contempt for naturalism. So antagonistic are 
the two philosophies that Croce’s first response to Dewey’s aesthetics – in 
1940, six years after the publication of Art as Experience – seems off the 
mark. He treats Dewey as an ungrateful client, not an adversary. After 
(justified) complaints about thin documentation and disregard for history, 
Croce notes the “obvious agreement of his [Dewey’s] doctrines with so-
called idealistic aesthetic,” explaining this by being “pleasantly surprised to 
meet on every page observations and theories long since formulated in 
Italy.” Disowning any “claim to authorship or priority,” Croce lists eighteen 
cases of happy coincidence – only five from the introductory chapters of 
Art as Experience that lay out the main lines of Dewey’s theory. In fact, 
the list masks the stark incompatibility of Croce’s theory with Dewey’s.27 
In his reply, published in 1948 with the English version of Croce’s 
review, Dewey doubts that anything on the list depends on “any 
philosophical system,” dismissing Croce’s points as little more than 
“commonplaces.” On the other hand, “slighting acknowledgments” is not 
his way, Dewey protests, nor is “xenophobia.” Yet he finds no “common 
ground” for an exchange. He charges that Croce has foreclosed 
                                                 
27
 Croce (1940), translated in Croce (1948a), the English version cited here; Dewey 
(1934), pp. 3-105. 
 68 
conversation by treating his aesthetics as “pragmatic philosophy,” whereas 
the burden of pragmatism is epistemic – a load that his aesthetics does not 
carry.
28
 
Pragmatism is a “theory of knowing,” he points out, and he has denied 
“that aesthetic subject matter is a form of knowledge.” Nonetheless, where 
his larger system posits a “pragmatic theory of knowledge,” its postulate is 
that “knowing is an activity of human beings as living beings,” and the 
same postulate holds for Art as Experience. Speaking of the title of that 
book, Dewey points to the ‘experience’ highlighted there and in his first 
chapter on “the live animal,” declaring his intent to illuminate two facts, 
both missed by Croce: first, his non-epistemic aesthetics is not pragmatist 
just because it is not epistemic; second, his pragmatist account of 
knowledge in non-aesthetic contexts is not empiricist – thus not a reversion 
to sensism, Croce’s bête noire.29 
Dewey’s defense wobbles. First, if Croce failed to see the point of 
Art as Experience, Dewey’s vigorous but disorderly writing was partly to 
blame. Had he read Italian, he might have emulated the bold, crisp 
sentences of the Estetica, especially its first schematic chapters. Second, just 
as Croce makes large claims for intuition as basic to philosophy itself, 
Dewey puts aesthetics at the head of the table whenever experience is on 
the menu. Hence, if his whole system is a philosophy of experience that 
includes a pragmatist account of knowledge, walling some of that 
philosophy off from pragmatism would be hard. 
Dewey’s reasoning did not persuade Croce: it made him angry, no 
longer just peeved. Four years later he replied, calling Dewey’s dismissal of 
his eighteen points “degrading” and “mortifying.” Despite Dewey’s 
declarations of 1948, Croce still assails his “persistent profession of 
empiricism and pragmatism,” decrying those views for damaging “the great 
and beautiful truth Dewey teaches.” What mainly upsets Croce, however, 
is that the American could find no common ground with him. His nolo 
contendere is unacceptable: not to engage is blind despair, not only 
impugning God’s goodness but also defiling the sacred soil where he and 
Dewey already stood together – “on the grounds of philosophy.”30  
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Croce also returns to Dewey’s harshest remarks in Art as Experience 
– the lines that castigate the Italian’s “philosophic preconceptions.” When 
Croce quoted the whole offending passage in 1948, he had let the 
preconceiving and the “arbitrary distortion” pass without comment, 
perhaps feeling that his own charge of “vicious circles and positivistic 
tautologies” would even up the name-calling. But in 1952 he behaved as 
if the insult had been festering. “When I read these words,” he fumes, “I 
thought I was dreaming … that in America a man like Dewey should 
represent me as the ‘extreme’ type … [that he] doesn’t even consider 
worthy of being refuted.” Dewey makes this gaffe because “empiricism 
and pragmatism have not been good counselors.” Duped by ingrained 
errors, he “cannot overcome the dualism of mind and nature,” so he lives 
with a delusion – “that he has overcome it by means of a continuous process 
of nature-mind, in which the hyphen connecting the two words would 
provide the victory.”31 
This old man’s squabble shows Croce at his best and worst, 
skewering his opponent with a mark of punctuation, then congratulating 
him on the natural gift of “genial insight” that has often led him to 
“speculative” truths. Had Dewey read those words, would he have realized 
that ‘speculative,’ said by an acolyte of the spirit, might – or might not – 
have been a term of praise? We will never know. Dewey never saw 
Croce’s final blast, published in September of 1952. The eminent American 
had died in the previous June, to be followed in November by his equally 
esteemed Italian critic.
32
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